`gjdZddlmZddlZddlZddlZddlZddlmZm Z dZ dZ dZ dZ ddZdd Zdd Zddd Ze f dd Zdd ZddZe fdd ddZy)u0Gateway-side relay authentication primitives. EXPERIMENTAL. The connector⇄gateway channel is authenticated because a gateway may be customer-managed and internet-exposed (see the connector repo ``docs/connector-gateway-auth-design.md``). This module is the **gateway half** of two HMAC schemes whose wire bytes must match the connector's TypeScript exactly: 1. **WS upgrade auth** (gateway → connector): the gateway presents ``Authorization: Bearer `` on the ``/relay`` WebSocket upgrade, where ``token = make_upgrade_token(gateway_id, secret)``. Mirrors the connector's ``relayAuthToken.ts`` ``makeToken`` (``src/core/relayAuthToken.ts``): ``base64url(f"{payload}:{exp}:{sig}")`` with ``sig = HMAC_SHA256(f"{payload}:{exp}", secret).hexdigest()`` and ``payload == gateway_id``. 2. **Inbound delivery signature** (connector → gateway): the connector signs each inbound POST with the per-tenant *delivery key*, carried as ``x-relay-timestamp`` + ``x-relay-signature`` headers; the gateway verifies before accepting the event. Mirrors the connector's ``deliverySigning.ts``: ``sig = HMAC_SHA256(f"{ts}.{body_json}", key).hexdigest()`` over the EXACT request body bytes, with a replay-window skew check. Both schemes use a **multi-secret verify list** (primary first, then a secondary during a rotation window), exactly like ``api/src/handlers/stats_oauth.ts`` — so a secret rotation doesn't invalidate outstanding tokens. EXPERIMENTAL: may change without a deprecation cycle until ≥2 Class-1 platforms validate the relay contract. ) annotationsN)OptionalSequencezx-relay-timestampzx-relay-signaturei,ctj|jd|jdtjj S)z?HMAC-SHA256 hex digest of ``payload`` under ``secret`` (UTF-8).utf-8)hmacnewencodehashlibsha256 hexdigestpayloadsecrets E/root/.hermes/venv/lib/python3.12/site-packages/gateway/relay/auth.py _hmac_hexr3s4 88FMM'*GNN7,CW^^ T ^ ^ ``ct||S)uHHMAC-SHA256 hex digest — the connector's ``sign`` (relayAuthToken.ts).)rrs rsignr8s Wf %%rc* tj|}t |dk(ry|D]T}|stjt ||}t |t |k7r=t j||sTyy#ttf$rYywxYw)zConstant-time check that ``sig_hex`` is a valid HMAC of ``payload`` under ANY of ``secrets`` (rotation window). Length-mismatched candidates are skipped without a timing leak. Mirrors ``verifySignature``. FrT)bytesfromhex ValueError TypeErrorlenrrcompare_digest)rsig_hexsecretssig_bufrexpecteds rverify_signaturer!=s --( 7|q ==7F!;< x=CL (    w 1   "sBBBc|dkDr ttj|znd}|d|}t||}|d|jd}t j |j djdS)u8Build a signed, optionally-expiring token — the connector's ``makeToken``. ``base64url(f"{payload}:{exp}:{sig}")`` where ``exp`` is a unix-seconds expiry (0 = never) and ``sig = HMAC_SHA256(f"{payload}:{exp}", secret)``. base64url is unpadded to match Node's ``Buffer.toString("base64url")``. r:rascii=)inttimerr base64urlsafe_b64encodedecoderstrip)rr ttl_secondsexpsignedsigraws r make_tokenr1Ss-8!O#diik [ (Cy# F FF #C HAcU  " "7 +C  # #C ( / / 8 ? ? DDrct|||S)a"The WS-upgrade bearer token a gateway sends: ``payload = gateway_id``. The connector peeks ``gateway_id`` (the payload head) to index its secret verify list, then verifies the signature against that gateway's stored secret(s). Mirrors the connector's ``makeUpgradeToken``. )r1) gateway_idrr,s rmake_upgrade_tokenr4as j&+ 66rc |dt| dzzz}tj|jdj d}|jd}t|dkry|d} t|d }dj|dd }|d k7r!ttj|kDry|d|}t|||r|SdS#t t f$rYywxYw#t $rYywxYw) aVerify a token built by ``make_token``; return the payload or None. Splits from the right so a payload may itself contain colons (mirrors the connector's ``verifyToken``). Rejects an expired token and any signature that doesn't match a secret in the verify list. r%r$rNr#r) rr(urlsafe_b64decoder r*rrsplitr&joinr'r!) tokenrpaddeddecodedpartsr/r-rr.s r verify_tokenrAmsU a00**6==+ABII'R MM# E 5zA~ )C%)nhhuSbz"G axC $s*y# F&vsG<7F$F  " s$AC0C%C"!C"% C10C1c|d|S)zASigned material for an inbound delivery: ``f"{ts}.{body_json}"``..)ts body_jsons r_delivery_payloadrGsT9+ r)nowc|r|sy t|}||nttj}t ||z |kDryt t ||||S#ttf$rYywxYw)uVerify a connector→gateway inbound delivery signature. ``body_json`` MUST be the exact request body bytes decoded as UTF-8 — the connector signs over the literal serialized body, so the gateway verifies over the literal received body (no re-serialization). Checks the timestamp is within ``max_skew_seconds`` of now and the HMAC matches any key in the rotation verify list. Mirrors the connector's ``verifyDeliverySignature``. F)r&rrr'absr!rG)rF timestamp signature verify_keysmax_skew_secondsrHrEcurrents rverify_delivery_signaturerPsw" I ^_c#diik*:G 7R<++ -b)r]s>#  %)) "a & , E6R 7 7  7/2 7 7G86 VVVVV V  V V Vr